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Re: [HTCondor-users] El Capitan and Sandbox
- Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2016 18:41:30 +0000
- From: Jaime Frey <jfrey@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [HTCondor-users] El Capitan and Sandbox
We have a fix for this problem. It will be included in HTCondor 8.4.9 and 8.5.7.
> On Jul 6, 2016, at 1:33 PM, Kolja Kauder <kkauder@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I would very much appreciate it when you find the time and Mac :)
> On Wed, Jul 6, 2016 at 2:30 PM, Jaime Frey <jfrey@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> HTCondor can be made smarter about this. It collects basic information about all processes on the system (pid, ppid, cpu/memory usage), constructs a tree of parent-child relationships, then queries this data for various purposes.
>> These are mainly tracking the cpu/memory usage of jobs while they run and identifying the descendants of an HTCondor daemon or job so that they can be killed along with the ancestor.
>> task_for_pid() is used to collect the cpu and memory usage of each process. HTCondor doesn't need to collect that for system processes. If we could identify SIP-protected processes and skip the task_for_pid() call for them, I believe that would eliminate the system log spam.
>> Unfortunately, my Mac died right around when this email thread began, so I can't work on a fix at the moment.
>> - Jaime Frey
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: HTCondor-users [mailto:htcondor-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxx]
>> I instinctively recoil at circumventing security features on this machine, but you have a point; I will mull on it.
>> BTW, this error comes from procd trying to call task_for_pid which is now heavily regulated.
>> On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 3:44 PM, Rich Pieri <ratinox@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 6/23/16 3:21 PM, Kolja Kauder wrote:
>>>> Since the machine is a visible server, that won't be a secure
>>>> long-term solution. It would however allow me to edit the Sandbox
>>> I fail to see how this follows. SIP offers no protection against
>>> remote attacks and essentially no local protection given how easy it
>>> is to exploit privileged binaries.
>>>> settings. Do I guess correctly that I only need to add a file called
>>>> condor_procd.sb containing (allow mach-priv-task-port
>>>> (*) )
>>>> ? (I didn't expect to ever use LISP outside .emacs :)
>>> My understanding is that changes to protected areas will be undone
>>> when you enable SIP. There may be ways around this but you'll have to
>>> go digging into the csrutil man pages to find them.
>>> Rich Pieri <ratinox@xxxxxxx>
>>> MIT Laboratory for Nuclear Science
Thanks and regards,
UW-Madison HTCondor Project